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BY all accounts, local government has made a
tremendous contribution to an impressive record of
extending service delivery to marginalised groups in
South Africa. At the same time, the challenges
remain daunting. Public perceptions of local
government are negative. Many communities and
residents see their municipality as a locus of
underperformance, corruption and inaccessibility.
The reasons behind the perceived and real
performance failures are multifold and their
discussion goes beyond the scope of this
Over the last 15 years, South Africa has transformed its local
government system from an illegitimate, racist institution into a
democratic institution with a developmental mandate. A new
generation of municipalities, lead by democratically elected
municipal councils, comprise the local government system.
contribution. However, a particularly disturbing
feature of the problems besetting local government is
the perception that democratically elected
representatives are inaccessible and unresponsive to
the needs of their communities. A significant
segment of our citizens do not see councillors as the
champions of their wards, or the guardians of
service delivery.
The allegation is that councillors are inward-
focused, preoccupied with the goings-on within the

















administration. This problem provides the main
backdrop to this paper. Why is it that many
communities do not trust their councillors and what
can be done to remedy this?
Communities, it is argued, often hold councillors
accountable for aspects of service delivery over which
the municipality has little or no control. For example,
communities may demand answers from councillors
regarding policing issues, education, housing
subsidies, identity documents and pensions, while the
Constitution locates competence over these issues
with national and provincial governments
concurrently. The South African system of
intergovernmental relations offers an advanced
architecture for intergovernmental service delivery
that should absorb and address fragmentation, but
the reality is that communities experience disjointed
service delivery. However, it is too easy to dispel the
levels of mistrust and misgivings of communities over
service delivery as the fallout of complex
intergovernmental relations. The continuing spate of
community protests, directed at councillors and
municipal officials is evidence of a serious breakdown
of relationships between communities and
councillors.
The paper examines how the functioning of
institutional relationships in municipalities contributes
to this breakdown. It investigates whether the
structure of the municipality itself prevents
councillors from becoming champions of their
communities. The paper also examines the interface
between politics and municipal administration. It
suggests that governance in South Africa may be
decentralised but politics is not. It concludes that,
while the local party caucus of the ruling party in the
municipality should be a platform for rigorous debate
of local municipal issues, it is often a proxy for
regional and sometimes even national politics. While
this is inevitable and, to a degree, legitimate in any
party-based system of municipal governance, the
degree of undue interference and in some cases
outright meddling, is threatening to drive a wedge
between communities and councillors.
The overall argument in this paper is that the
functioning of municipal councils is too heavily
weighted towards the preparation and adoption of
executive and administrative decisions and that, as a
result, municipal councils do not hold the municipal
executive and the administration accountable.
Communities thus regard councillors as “complicit”
in the municipal machinery rather than as potential
allies in their quest to engage the municipality.
The conflation of legislative and executive roles
in the council by the Constitution is often posited as
a design flaw and is therefore a key thread
throughout this discussion. The paper provides some
options for institutional change. Importantly,
diagnosing institutional flaws and suggesting
solutions for these flaws is only part of the answer.
The critical need that emerges is one of ethical
leadership on the part of local government politicians
and their administrators, but also on the part of the
party political structures that surround the local
state.
The conflation of legislative and executive role in the council
by the Constitution is often posited as a design flaw
The findings of this research report are based on a
series of interviews conducted in 2008 and 2009
with senior municipal officials and politicians
throughout the country. Further evidence is drawn
from three municipal workshops conducted in 2009.
Conflation of legislative
and executive roles
A feature of local government (that is common to
many nations) is the absence of a strict separation of
Ethical Leadership and Political Culture in Local Government
52
powers between legislative and executive branches
within the local government authority.
Indeed, section 151(2) of the Constitution provides
that both legislative and executive powers are vested
in the Municipal Council.
Municipalities themselves are the most critical in
delineating roles and responsibilities. The legislation
offers three instruments that municipalities should
utilise for this purpose. The terms of reference (s 53
Municipal Systems Act) outlines roles and
responsibilities of political office-bearers, political
structures and the municipal manager. The
municipality’s delegations (s 59 Municipal Systems
Act) represent the legal transfers of components of
the council’s executive and administrative authority
to political office-bearers, political structures and the
administration. Finally the council’s rules and orders
(s 160(6) Constitution) contain important rules
surrounding the role of the speaker.
Increasingly, the conflation of legislative and
executive powers is being singled out as the cause
for the problems in local governance. The
Department of Cooperative Governance and
Traditional Affairs (CoGTA) is investigating whether
the functions should be separated (Carrim 2009). In
this paper, it is argued that the conflation of
legislative and executive authority indeed presents a
challenge to municipalities. The division of
responsibility between legislatures and executive
structures is relatively clear at national and provincial
level, where the Constitution itself separates the two.
Municipalities, however, are tasked with managing
these complex relationships in an environment of
limited institutional options.
The conflation of legislative and executive
authority in the municipal council presents three
specific challenges to municipalities. Firstly, it
complicates the position of the speaker of the
council. Secondly, the question as to who is in
charge of the municipal administration becomes
more difficult to answer. Thirdly, it encourages
municipalities to adopt inappropriate committee
systems. These three challenges are discussed in
turn. With respect to all three challenges, it is argued
Communities regard councillors as “complicit” in the
municipal machinery rather than as potential allies in their
quest to engage the municipality.
Statutory law provides for a degree of separation. It
establishes a system of municipal executives. In the
main, municipalities could be operating one of two
systems. The first, and most popular, system is the
executive mayoral system. The council elects an
executive mayor who exercises all executive
authority. The executive mayor appoints a mayoral
committee to assist him or her. The second, less
popular, system is the collective executive system.
The council elects an executive committee that
collectively exercises executive authority. Decision-
making authority on the “typology” (i.e. whether the
municipality has an executive committee or an
executive mayor) ultimately vests in the Member of
Executive Committee (MEC) for local government.
There are no specific criteria in the law that guide his
or her decision-making, but attributes of the
municipal area, such as population size and the
number of wards, should undoubtedly play a role.
Importantly, neither of the two executives – the
executive mayor or the executive committee – have
any original executive authority. The council
delegates parts of its executive authority to its
executive mayor or executive committee. As the
delegating authority, the council therefore remains
ultimately responsible for the exercise of executive
authority and has concomitant controlling powers
over the executive.
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that separating the executive and legislative roles will
not materially affect governance in a positive way.
Rather, the solution lies in a better utilisation of the
existing policy and legal frameworks and,
importantly, effective political and administrative
leadership.
The role of the speaker
The first challenge relates to the role of the speaker.
In a context where legislative and executive roles are
separated, such as the parliamentary system at
national and provincial level, the role of the speaker
is clear. He or she is in charge of the legislative
chamber and plays little, if any, role in the executive,
of which he or she is not a member. Administratively,
the speaker oversees the implementation of the
assembly’s budget, which is separate from the
executive’s budget.
In the local government context, where the
executive and legislative roles are merged, the
situation is markedly different. Firstly, in
constitutional terms, the speaker is a member of the
executive because the council is designated as the
executive by the Constitution. Even though the
council may delegate much of the executive decision-
making authority to the executive committee or
executive mayor (particularly in larger
municipalities), there are always executive and
administrative decisions that the full council must
take – under the chairpersonship of the speaker.1
While the speaker as a political office-bearer is
clearly separate from the other councillors and from
the administration, the office of the speaker is not
administratively separate from the municipal
administration. The municipal council does not
operate a separate budget from the administration’s
budget. The speaker is therefore dependent on the
municipal executive and the municipal administration
when it comes to the formulation and the
implementation of his or her budget. There is thus no
basis for the speaker to formulate and administer a
budget that is separate from the administration’s
budget.
Municipal legislation defines the role of the speaker
as mainly related to the traditional speaker’s role of
chairing council meetings and enforcing the Code of
Conduct for Councillors.2  Ordinarily, the speaker is the
driver of council investigations into transgressions of
the Code of Conduct. The law indicates that the speaker
must conduct an investigation when he or she suspects
a transgression.3  Often, a council committee assists the
speaker in this. The law leaves room for further
delegation of responsibilities to the office of the
speaker. In some instances, this is used to delegate
responsibilities to the speaker that go outside of the
classical conception of the role of a speaker.
In practice, the role definition of speaker has been
fraught with difficulty. Ever since the introduction of the
office of the speaker in 2000, municipalities have
reported conflicts, internal tensions and political battles
over the responsibilities of the speaker vis-à-vis the
mayor (De Visser and Akintan 2008:15). At the very
least, these conflicts often contributed to a toxic
environment and an inward-focused predisposition of
the council. In the worst cases, these conflicts resulted
in basic governance functions grinding to a halt due to
political stalemates, thus resulting in service delivery
disruptions. The reality in many of these conflicts is
that the role confusion between the speaker and the
mayor is the platform where conflicts between and
within parties are played out, at great cost to the
community.
In many cases, the executive leadership of the
municipality is reluctant to entrust the speaker with
enforcing the Code of Conduct for Councillors and
speakers complain of insistent meddling in council
investigations. Conversely, there are instances where
the speaker has been alleged to abuse his or her
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investigative authority for political ends. This is
particularly the case in those municipalities where
the offices of the speaker and the mayor have been
allocated to cement coalitions across different
parties or to appease opposing political factions
within one party.
There are institutional and legal solutions that
can be considered. As the problem is rooted in the
conflation of legislative and executive powers, the
separation of these powers would contribute to a
clearer division of roles between the speaker and the
municipal executive. The most drastic solution would
be to abolish the office of the speaker altogether and
return to the system whereby the mayor chairs
council meetings. Code of Conduct issues could be
assigned to council committees (De Visser and
Akintan 2008:22). However, the office of the speaker
is now an entrenched institution populated by full-
time office-bearers.4  The abolition will face
considerable political opposition. Furthermore, to its
credit, the office of the speaker has in many
municipalities contributed positively to the
development of community participation strategies
and practices and diluted what would otherwise have
been a dangerous concentration of power in the
municipal executive.
The Code of Conduct for Councillors could be
revisited. Even judges have commented that the Code
is not a shining example of clear legislative drafting.5
It could be changed to ensure that the role of the
speaker – and particularly the interface between the
speaker and other council structures and office-
bearers around Code of Conduct issues – is set out
in clearer terms.
It is, however, suggested that institutional and
legal solutions are not necessarily the answer. The
problems can be addressed within the current
legislative framework. Research suggests that many
municipalities have not adequately dealt with the
delineation of roles and responsibilities in the
instruments offered by the legislation, such as the
terms of reference, delegation and rules and orders
(De Visser and Akintan 2008:20). In many
municipalities, the poor quality of these instruments
contributes to the creation of unnecessary grey areas
and overlap in responsibilities. The terms of
reference, in particular, is a mandatory instrument
that is specifically designed to deal with overlapping
responsibilities, grey areas and disputes. Most
municipalities have not adopted this instrument.
The problems often emanate from poor political
leadership and a treatment of these offices as a
means of access to power and resources. The
designation of the office of the speaker as a full-time
position has been an important contributing factor in
this regard. The adoption of the terms of reference,
which is a document outlining the organisational
values, dispute resolution rules and reporting rules,
requires a special type of leadership from the
municipality. It can be validly adopted by ordinary
majority resolution. However, the reality is that every
councillor should endorse it for it to be effective.
There is no point in 51% of the councillors
respecting the role of the speaker, as outlined in the
terms of reference, and 49% of the councillors not.
The adoption and implementation of the terms of
reference therefore requires particularly skilful
leadership that crosses political and factional divides
in order to achieve better governance.
Political-administrative
interface
The second challenge relates to so-called political-
administrative interface – the question of who directs
the municipal administration? Once again, in a
context where legislative and executive powers are
constitutionally separated, this question is less
pertinent. For example, at a national level, the
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national executive – the President with his or her
cabinet – directs the executive. Parliament oversees
the executive and may call in administrators to
account to it, but it has no immediate authority over
those administrators. A similar situation prevails at a
provincial level.
Local government, again, works in a more
complex manner. Since the Constitution designates
the municipal council as the executive, it is
essentially the employer of all municipal staff.
Legislation has sought to separate the council from
the administration to some extent. The Municipal
Systems Act mandates the municipal council to
appoint senior managers (the municipal manager and
managers that report to him or her, see s 82(1)(a)
Municipal Structures Act and s 56 Municipal
Systems Act) and further appointments are made by
the administration itself. The Code of Conduct for
Councillors includes a provision that prohibits
councillors from interfering in the administration
(item 11 Schedule 1 Systems Act). Taking a harder
line of separation, the Municipal Finance
Management Act has barred councillors from taking
part in tender decisions (s 117 MFMA) and includes
many provisions that seek to separate the council
from the administration.
In practice, however, the political-administrative
interface has become the Achilles heel of many
municipalities. There is no doubt that councillors,
members of municipal executives and officials are
struggling to define clear roles. The political
administrative interface and the role confusion
between speakers and mayor are the most
problematic area. This is aggravated by undue
political interference by political parties. There is
growing concern around the inappropriate
relationship between regional party structures and
municipalities. There are reports of instances where
regional party structures seek to operate
municipalities by remote control.
Regional party structures should focus on ... providing overall
strategic guidance. Instead, they often seem to focus their attention
on two aspects: staff appointments and tenders.
Regional party structures should focus on
recruitment and deployment of suitable candidates
for political office in municipalities, ensuring and
overseeing the ethics among their cadres and
providing overall strategic guidance in the form of
party political programmes. Instead, they often seem
to focus their attention on two aspects: staff
appointments and tenders. The following case
illustrates a particularly clear example of party
political intervention in a senior appointment:
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A recent court case concerned the appointment of a municipal manager for Amathole District Municipality.
There were two final contenders for the position, Dr Mlokoti and Mr Zenzile. The judgment (Vuyo Mlokoti
v Amathole District Municipality and Mlamli Zenzile, unreported judgment, Case No: 1428/2008, 6
November 2008) records overwhelming evidence to the effect that Dr Mlokoti outperformed Mr Zenzile in
the interviews and assessments. It furthermore records that two legal opinions were obtained by the
municipality, advising the municipality that appointing Mr. Zenzile would be illegal in the face of the
obvious differences in skills, experience and qualifications. During the meeting of the African National
Congress (ANC) caucus, preceding the council meeting where the appointment decision was due to be
made, the legal opinions were discussed. The caucus resolved to withhold the opinions from the council.
At the meeting, Mr Zenzile was appointed as municipal manager, a decision that was taken on review by Dr
Mlokoti. The judgment concludes, “that the Regional Executive Committee of the ANC instructed the
caucus to appoint Mr. Zenzile and the caucus carried out this instruction”. In fact, subsequent to the
appointment, the Executive Mayor requested, on the official letterhead of the municipality, guidance from
the ANC’s Eastern Cape Chairperson. He informed the party in rather revealing language that it has ‘erred
by not resolving to appoint Dr Mlokoti’. In assessing this scenario, the judge in the matter, Pickering J,
does not mince his words:
‘In my view, the involvement of the Regional Executive Council of the ANC (…) constituted an
unauthorized and unwarranted intervention in the affairs of [the municipality]. It is clear that the
councillors of the ANC supinely abdicated to their political party their responsibility to fill the
position of the Municipal Manager with the best qualified and best suited candidate on the basis of
qualifications, suitability and with due regard to the provisions of pertinent employment legislation
(…). This was a responsibility owed to the electorate as a whole and not just to the sectarian
interests of their political masters. (…)
[The council] has demonstrated a lamentable abdication of its responsibilities by succumbing to a
political directive from an external body, regardless of the merits of the matter. It continues, with an
equally lamentable lack of insight into its conduct, to contend that it was proper for it to have done
so.’
This judgment may be one of the few pieces of irrefutable evidence of improper party political interference
into appointment decisions. The scenario, recorded by the Court as uncontested facts, reveals a disturbing
conflation of party and state. There is a fine line between strategic political guidance on the one hand and
undue interference on the other. The unconcealed interference and manipulation of processes designed to
obtain quality managerial leadership and the calculated hiding of essential information shows that, in this
case at least, both the council and the party crossed that line and thus engaged in cronyism.
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Too many reports of fraud and corruption in
municipalities, as detailed elsewhere in this State of
Local Government report, point towards
inappropriate interference exercised by political
office-bearers. A particular manifestation of the
conflation of party and state at local government
level is the practice whereby party office-bearers
populate the municipal administration. In other
words, a regional secretary or branch chairperson
would be appointed as an official in the municipal
administration. The rationale is not difficult to grasp:
as senior municipal officials are generally paid better
than councillors, their posts are often more attractive
than political office.
parties to provide support, guidance and political
accountability. The Deputy-Minister for Cooperative
Governance and Traditional Affairs recently remarked:
‘…it’s not for the party structures to micro-manage
councillors, especially as this has sometimes less to do
with ensuring that councillors per form effectively and
more to do with influencing tenders and narrowly
interfering in appointment of staff. Municipal structures
should not be treated almost like sub-committees of
party structures’ (quoted in Local Government
Research Centre 2009:16). If party structures serve
narrow personal or factional interests, this is
fundamentally detrimental to the developmental local
government enterprise. Councillors of integrity find
themselves forced to resist interference by their own
party structures acting outside their legitimate ambit.
Such interference drives a wedge between councillors
and their communities and creates insecurity for
councillors within their own political organisations.
What is the way forward with regard to the
problem of undue political interference, considering
that political parties are vital to the survival of the local
government system? Would the separation of
legislative and executive roles help? There is some
argument to be made that the conflation of legislative
and executive roles in local government adds fuel to
the fire in respect of political interference. In its
executive role, the council as an assembly is the locus
of executive and administrative decision-making that
deals with the hard and immediate allocation of
resources, jobs and power.
In its legislative role, the council is able to step
back from the above and focus on policy-making,
appropriation and oversight. It is likely that the latter
will prove less attractive to the proverbial political
fraudster. In that line of argument, separating the
legislative and executive roles may thus remove the
incentive for party structures to interfere in council
decision-making. However, it is suggested that trans-
anecdotes of officials taking political precedence over
their mayor and the resultant comedy of protocol have
become a source of great hilarity in local government
The consequences, however, are often dire and result
in a municipality being “rewired” in a very damaging
way. The normal lines of political accountability do
not apply and the administration takes on an
inappropriately dominant role in the municipal polity.
The anecdotes of municipal officials taking political
precedence over their mayor and the resultant
comedy of protocol as well as the so-called
“untouchables” in the administration have become a
source of great hilarity in local government. However,
the sad reality is that the municipalities where this
phenomenon manifests itself often degenerate into
utter bureaucratic and political paralysis as a result
of sliding staff morale and perennial power
struggles. It does not take long for this bureaucratic
and political fiasco to spill over into service delivery
and communities ultimately bear the consequences.
The municipal governance system is shaped
around political parties and depends on political
Ethical Leadership and Political Culture in Local Government
58
forming the council into a legislative and oversight
body will not do much to mitigate undue party
interference. The inclination to interfere will merely
shift focus from the council to the municipal
executive and perhaps become even more intense.
party-political and administrative office would
undoubtedly raise eyebrows yet the combination at
municipal level is condoned.
Simple legal remedies appear to be at hand. For
example, a specific provision should be inserted in
the Municipal Systems Act, which creates an
incompatibility between municipal officialdom and
holding senior office in a political party. This will
encourage politicians to decide between a political or
an administrative career, rather than seeking to com-
bine both to the detriment of municipal governance.
In addition, political parties themselves can adopt the
incompatibility in their internal rules and deploy their
candidates in accordance with those rules.
Thirdly, it is suggested that the rules in the
Municipal Systems Act surrounding staff
appointments and staff discipline are clarified.
Practice indicates a number of areas of confusion.
The legislation limits the municipal council’s
involvement with staff appointments to three
aspects. Firstly, the council adopts human resources
policies, including a recruitment policy, to be
implemented by the municipal manager. Secondly, as
indicated earlier, the council appoints senior
managers. Thirdly, the council oversees the
implementation of its human resource policies.
The position of the local caucus of councillors needs to be
redefined. It should be repositioned as a political structure
that, while subject to reasonable strategic and ethical
oversight by higher party structures, is also trusted to make
decisions relating to local governance matters without the
threat of being second-guessed or by-passed.
What is suggested is a combination of political and
institutional solutions. Firstly, political parties need
to recast their roles vis-à-vis local government,
particularly at regional level. While political party
structures at national level cannot be accused of
endorsing the rogue practices of some regional party
structures, they clearly have done too little to rein
them in. The position of the local caucus of coun-
cillors needs to be redefined. It should be reposi-
tioned as a political structure that, while subject to
reasonable strategic and ethical oversight by higher
party structures, is also trusted to make decisions
relating to local governance matters without the
threat of being second-guessed or by-passed.
Secondly, it seems inconsistent that the local
government system should allow an overlap between
party political office and municipal officialdom while
other parts of the public administration discourage
senior party officials from holding office. Would it be
acceptable for example, for the Secretary-General of
the African National Congress to be a Director-
General in a national department? Could the
Chairman of the Democratic Alliance’s Federal
Council also be a Head of Department in the Western
Cape provincial government? Such a conflation of
incompatibility between municipal officialdom and senior
office in a political party will encourage politicians to decide
between a political or an administrative career
However, practice suggests that the council or
councillors seek involvement with human resources
issues on a variety of other levels. For example, the
practice of councillors being part of appointment
committees for staff other than senior management
is not unknown, albeit clearly illegal. Also common is
the practice whereby councillors sit in on staff
interviews as observers.
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Another major area of confusion is the position
of the managers that report to the municipal
manager. The council appoints them but they report
to the municipal manager. The law is not clear as to
where the responsibility and authority lies to
discipline these officials when they violate staff
codes. As these senior managers are political
appointments, made by the council, this is often an
arena where politics and administration cross
swords. Add to this the worst-case scenario, namely
where the senior manager is an office-bearer in the
structures of the ruling party and there is no realistic
way out of the conundrum.
It seems clear that the rules regarding staff
appointments and discipline need to be clarified. The
Municipal Systems Act should follow the same hard
line as the Municipal Finance Management Act and
limit the council’s role to the abovementioned three
aspects. A serious debate is also required on the
need for the municipal council to appoint managers
that report to the municipal manager. This
configuration is not followed in the national or
provincial public service, where the accounting
officer of the relevant department appoints deputy
director-generals.
Why are appointments of senior managers in
local government explicitly labelled as political
appointments in the sense that they are made the
council, a political body? The rationale may have
been to seek synergy between the administration
and the council and it may have fitted the overall
theme of a council that is both legislator and
executive. However, the appointment of senior
managers by the council is potentially a source of
conflict and tension between the municipal manager
and his or her political masters. This could be
mitigated by placing the responsibility squarely on
the municipal manager, perhaps in consultation with
the mayor.
Committee systems
The political functioning of municipal councils is
built on democratic norms like responsiveness,
informed decision-making and oversight. With regard
to the latter, the Auditor-General, in presenting the
2007/08 audit outcomes for local government,
observed that financial management of municipalities
improved significantly in areas where opposition
parties pressure a ruling party (Pressly 2009). This
important observation points to the value of
democratic oversight exercised by the council over
the functioning of the executive as an indispensible
element of good governance.
The system of local government, by conflating
legislative and executive roles in the council, does
not in itself create ideal circumstances for political
oversight by the council over the executive and the
administration.
However, this by no means exonerates municipalities
from using the system to facilitate oversight. In fact,
the research suggests that many municipalities have
adopted political structures that hamper, rather than
improve, oversight. This relates specifically to
committee systems.
It goes without saying that portfolio committees
are critical for the functioning of the council. In any
functioning democratic assembly the hard work is
done in the committees. That is where the impact of
decisions on communities and residents are
discussed in detail. The same applies to
municipalities. It is only in the smallest
municipalities that committee systems are
superfluous. In all others, they are critical to ensure
Municipal committee systems must function not only to support
the municipal executive and prepare council decisions, but also as
committees that exercise oversight
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robust engagement between councillors, municipal
executives and the administration.
In terms of the law, municipalities have the
freedom to fashion their own committee systems.
Sections 79 and 80 of the Municipal Structures Act
provide the basis for municipal committees. “Section
79 committees” comprise all, or most, parties on the
council and report to the council. They are chaired by
a councillor who is not a member of the municipal
executive. “Section 80 committees” also comprise
all, or most, parties on the council but report to the
municipal executive. These committees are chaired
by a member of the executive (i.e. a member of the
executive committee or mayoral committee) and are
designed to assist the executive. Municipalities may
adopt combinations of the above two systems.
Practice, however, suggests that most
municipalities opt for the adoption of section 80
committees for all portfolios. It is usually only the
Code of Conduct issues that are dealt with by a
section 79 committee. Municipalities in the Gauteng
province are the exception; most of them have
adopted section 79 committees. The result of the
practice in other provinces is that municipal councils
operate in terms of a committee system that exists to
support the executive.
The normal course of events is that items
(reports, recommendations and draft resolutions) are
prepared by the administration and then discussed
and refined by the section 80 committee chaired by
the member of the municipal executive. The
executive submits the item to the plenary council
meeting. In most cases, the deliberation at the full
council meeting is minimal as the preparatory work
is done in the committee. This practice is not
inclusive of all elected officials and does not assist in
creating sound democratic practices. In fact, it
directly limits oversight by the council over the
executive and administration. In as much as portfolio
committees function as working groups where
decisions are refined and political coalitions are
welded, they should also be the engines of
democratic assemblies where policies and decisions
are interrogated, progress is measured and the hard
questions are asked in an open and vigorous debate.
The work of committees should be geared
towards exercising oversight over the municipal
executive and administration. Oversight and progress
assessment should be the key concern of a
committee meeting. These functions form the core of
the committees’ democratic purpose and provide
councillors with the platform to raise the concerns of
their constituency. When a committee’s function is
reduced to preparing items to be considered by the
municipal executive, councillors may rightfully feel
that their purpose is essentially technical or
administrative.
It is therefore important for the advancement of
local democracy that municipal committee systems
function not only to support the municipal executive
and prepare council decisions, but also as
committees that exercise oversight over the
municipal executive and administration. This can be
achieved without separating legislative from
executive roles. If municipalities argue that currently
there are too few ordinary councillors capable of
chairing section 79 committees, then they need to
invest in and nurture such skills. If political parties
and municipalities are serious about enhancing local
democracy, they will not be adverse to empowering
councillors to take up these roles.
Conclusion
This paper dealt with a number of critical governance
challenges in municipalities. It is suggested that
these challenges deserve the attention of
municipalities and political parties but also of
supervising provincial and national governments.
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The quality of local democracy needs to be greatly
improved if a more constructive relationship between
communities and their municipalities is to be
achieved. The conflation of legislative and executive
authority in the municipal council is an important
feature of local government. However, it need not
dominate every municipal function, and its negative
consequences may be limited without entering into a
lengthy debate on the need for a separation of
powers. Instead, the relevant stakeholders – national
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lawmakers, municipalities and supervising provinces –
should consider smaller institutional changes to the
governance makeup of municipalities. Even more
importantly, the political and administrative leadership
of municipalities and political structures that surround
them should be acutely aware of the disastrous
consequences that inappropriate political leadership
has on the functioning of municipalities and therefore
on service delivery.
